Indicators of Risks to Media Pluralism

Explanation

Media Audience Concentration

There are few sources to measure audience shares -the number of people who purchase a type of media- in Peru. In addition, such measurements have limitations.

There are two fundamental problems: 1) in several measurements not all types of media are measured, but only those who are clients of the company carrying out the measurement; and 2) the public is not calculated at 100%, but only those who purchase the types of media that the ranking measures.

This indicator attempts to evaluate the concentration of the audience and readership -when the audience purchases only a few types of media- along the various platforms, based on audience share. This concentration is measured by adding the participation of the four biggest companies by sector, as this is the most common way to do so in economic calculations.

In order to establish indicators it is considered that concentration is low if the sum of the audience of all types of media of the groups in the Top 4 have an audience share below 25%; medium if it is between 25% and 49%; and high if greater than 50%.

Television 

To measure this concentration on television we use Kantar Ibope's 2015 measurement of average number of viewers per hour. They calculate the audience of six open television channels whose clients are: América Televisión, Latina, Panamericana, ATV, ATV+ and Red TV. In addition, they measure the total number of cable users.

Schedule
(06:00 – 23:59)

Average number of viewers (thousands)

Average Rating

América Televisión

486.5

3.9

Latina

346.7

2.8

ATV

229.5

1.8

Panamericana

71.3

0.6

Red TV

53.5

0.4

ATV+

18.0

0.1

Total cable

655.2

5.2

VHS / DVD / VJ

132.8

1.1

Otros / Locales / UHF / NI

123.5

1.0

Total TV

2,117.0

16.8


As the measurement does not include 100% of the actual public, it is not possible to use the standardized methodology that MOM is following in all the countries in which it is being implemented. But to have an approximation it is possible to make some calculations.

If we add the audience share of the 4 biggest channels, América Televisión (486,500), Latina (346,700), ATV (229,500) and Panamericana (71,300) it gives an average of 1,134,000 viewers per hour. This represents 53% of the public that Kantar Ibope measures on television. If only the first three channels are considered, they already reach 50% of the audience.

Risk: High

Why?

Risk is considered high when the audience share of the 4 principal companies is above 50%. 

Radio

As regards radio, the average of the two national surveys made by the Compañía Peruana de estudios de mercado y opinión (Peruvian Company of Market and Opinion Studies) (CPI) in 2015 has been used to determine listening preferences on a weekly basis. The 17 stations (100%) that appear on this list belong to only four media groups.

    Average % Average (thousands)
RPP GrupoRPP 24.7 4728
La Karibeña Corporacion Universal 20.9 3999.15
Moda CRP Medios 19.25 3675.5
Panamericana Panamericana de Radios 14.85 2846.65
Ritmo Romántica CRP Medios 14.8 2833.45
Nueva Q CRP Medios 14.6 2788.25
La Zona GrupoRPP 13.8 2637.7
La Inolvidable CRP Medios 12.7 2432.5
Onda Cero Panamericana de Radios 11.6 2209.55
Felicidad GrupoRPP 9.05 1736.05
Exitosa Corporacion Universal 9 1728.55
La Kalle Corporacion Universal 8.95 1711.45
Corazón GrupoRPP 6.8 1300.6
Studio 92 GrupoRPP 6.4 1220.85
Oxígeno GrupoRPP 5.7 1089.2
Planeta CRP Medios 5.3 1009.45
Capital GrupoRPP 5.15 971.9

The four groups hold 100% of the audience share that CPI measures.

Although it is not possible to apply the MOM standardized methodology because the audience of the rest of the radio stations in the market is unknown (100% real), it is not ruled out that the concentration in the Top 4 is very high.

Risk: High

Why?

Risk is considered high when the audience share of the 4 principal companies is above 50%.

Newspapers

There is no recent data. In order to select the 10 Peruvian newspapers, the 2013 and 2014 data from the Sociedad de Empresas Periodísticas del Perú (Society of Journalistic Companies in Peru) was used. According to this data, there was information on only nine types of media with national coverage. It was decided to incorporate Exitosa, a Corporación Universal newspaper, as tenth due to it having national coverage and relevance for the formation of public opinion.

According to this data, the Grupo El Comercio newspapers control 80% effective circulation of newspapers and 78% readership in the market, a figure that was reached after the purchase of Epensa, a company that edited the newspapers Correo, El Bocón, Ojo and Ajá.

After that purchase, newspaper circulation numbers have not been openly spread.

Risk: High

Why?

Risk is considered high when the readership of the 4 principal companies is above 50%. In this case, one single group far exceeds that figure.

Internet

The average number of monthly visits to Peruvian websites in 2015 is 109,952,846, according to the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB). The limitation is that they only their clients’ websites are measured. This ranking does not include, for example, institutional state websites or social networks. Almost all Peruvian digital media is considered.

Although the standardized MOM methodology cannot be applied, some approximations can be made. If only the first twenty types of media of the IAB's annual ranking are added, we can see that Grupo El Comercio (72.3 million), Grupo RPP (16.4 million), Grupo La República (11.7 million) and Latina (3.4 million) represent 92.93% visits to national websites that are registered on the IAB.

The digital media of Grupo El Comercio alone represents 65% Internet audience as measured by the IAB.

Risk: High

Risk is considered high when the readership of the 4 principal companies is above 50%. In this case, one single group far exceeds that figure.

Media Ownership Concentration

In order to calculate whether the company has market concentration, the market shares -one type of media’s percentage of the total revenue in the sector- of the four biggest groups must be added together. The problem is that in Peru this information has not been established: neither the amount of total media revenue, nor the total amount of investment in advertising, nor the profits of media companies and all their subsidiaries.

This indicator attempts to assess the horizontal concentration of ownership in the media sector. This concentration is measured using the Top4 concentration measure.

In order to establish indicators, concentration is considered low if the sum of the audience of all types of media of the groups in the 4 principal companies have an audience share below 25%; medium if it is between 25% and 49%; and high if greater than 50%.

Television.

Risk: No data

There is no information on audience shares, as is the case here.

Radio.

Risk: No data

Why?

There is no information on audience shares, as is the case here.

Qualitative research shows that the four groups in Lima generate 100% of the audience share measured by CPI. It is difficult to see that the sum of the other stations that have not been measured reach 50% of market share. Especially if you take into account that the audience share serves to sell advertising space.

Press.

Risk: No data

Why?

There is no information on audience shares, as is the case here.

Qualitative research shows that only Grupo El Comercio generates more profit than the sum of all other media companies that it competes with in this area. Due to the information exchange between the GEC declarations to the Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores (Superintendence of Market Values) and the information declared by the companies themselves in the yearbook "Peru: The Top 10,000 Companies 2015", it is estimated that the total income of the nine most important media groups in all sectors is S/. 2,500 million. Of that, the GEC and its subsidiaries generated an income of S/. 1,400 million.

Internet.

Risk: 

Why?

There is no information on audience shares, as is the case here.

Qualitative research shows that Grupo El Comercio generates more profits than the sum of all other media companies that it competes with in this area.

Regulatory Safeguards: Media Ownership Concentration

This indicator is intended to assess the existence and effective application of regulatory safeguards (sector specific and/or competition law) in contrast to a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the different media companies.

TELEVISION 

Television

Description

Yes

No

N/A

MD

 

Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector?

This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the TELEVISION sector.

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

But only for open channel TV

 

 

 

Existence (E) of safeguards

Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the audiovisual sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?

This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.

 

X

 

 

 

 

Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:

·     Refusal of additional licences;

·     Blocking of a merger or acquisition;

·     Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;

·     Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors

·     divestiture.

 

 

 

X

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

 

X

 

X

X

 

 

Total

 

 

 

 

 

 

To the question: Is there evidence (for example, in case law or positive evaluations in independent reports) that these powers are being effectively and properly exercised?

Risk: Medium

Why?

Risk is considered medium when the authority does not always use its powers in all relevant cases.

There is no regulation for cable channels.

The radio and television law states that it will be considered hoarding when a natural person or legal entity owns 30% or more of the television frequencies available in the same frequency band in the same locality. It clarifies that one will be considered a single legal entity and includes two or more persons that are shareholders, associates, directors or managers, who are natural persons or relatives within the second degree of consanguinity.

The Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones (Ministry of Transport and Communications) is responsible for ensuring compliance.

However, as we can see, this impediment can be evaded by the companies that try to hoard the market, using different legal entities.

PRESS

PRINT

Description

Yes

No

N/A

MD

 

Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector?

This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the print  sector.

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

 

 

 

Existence (E) of safeguards

Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the audiovisual sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?

This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.

 

 

 

 

 

X

 

 

Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:

·     Refusal of additional licences;

·     Blocking of a merger or acquisition;

·     Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;

·     Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors

·     divestiture.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

 

X

 

X

 

X

 

X

 

 

Total

 

 

 

 

 

 


To the question: Is there evidence (for example, in case law or positive evaluations in independent reports) that these powers are being effectively and properly exercised?

Risk: High

Why?

Risk is considered high when the authority does not use its powers. In this case, there is no authority that can intervene.

In November 2013, eight journalists filed a request for defense to ask for the annulment of the purchase of Epensa by Grupo El Comercio on the grounds that market hoarding violates freedom of expression and goes against the Constitution. This process has not yet been resolved by the Corte Superior de Justicia de Lima (Superior Court of Justice in Lima). No authority has taken a position on the issue.

The main problem is that the access barrier for newspapers is economic, a subject that is not replicated on the Internet, where access barriers are minimal. 

INTERNET

INTERNET

Description

Yes

No

N/A

MD

 

Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector?

This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the TELEVISION sector.

 

 

 

 

 

X

 

 

Existence (E) of safeguards

Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the audiovisual sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?

This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.

 

 

 

 

X

 

 

Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:

·     Refusal of additional licences;

·     Blocking of a merger or acquisition;

·     Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;

·     Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors

·     divestiture.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

 

Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?

This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the television media.

Low risk: the relevant authority effectively uses its sanctioning powers in all the relevant cases

Medium risk: the authority's powers are not always used in all the relevant

 

 

 

X

 

Total

 

 

 

 

 

 

To the question: Is there evidence (for example, in case law or positive evaluations in independent reports) that these powers are being effectively and properly exercised?

Risk: Low

Why?

Does not apply. On the Internet there are no licenses and access barriers are minimal.

RADIO

RADIO

Description

Yes

No

N/A

MD

 

Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector?

This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the TELEVISION sector.

 

X

 

 

 

 

Existence (E) of safeguards

Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the audiovisual sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?

This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.

 

 

X

 

 

 

 

Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:

·     Refusal of additional licences;

·     Blocking of a merger or acquisition;

·     Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;

·     Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors

·     divestiture.

 

 

 

 

X

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

 

X

 

X

 

 

X

 

 

Total

 

 

 

 

 

 

To the question: Is there evidence (for example, in case law or positive evaluations in independent reports) that these powers are being effectively and properly exercised?

Risk: Medium

Why?

Risk is considered medium when the authority does not always use its powers in all relevant cases.

The radio and television law states that it will be considered hoarding when a natural person or legal entity owns 20% or more of the television frequencies available in the same frequency band in the same locality. It clarifies that one will be considered a single legal entity and includes two or more persons that are shareholders, associates, directors or managers, who are natural persons or relatives within the second degree of consanguinity. The Ministry of Transport and Communications is responsible for ensuring compliance.

However, this impediment can be evaded by the companies that try to hoard the market, by using different legal entities that serve the same group or by renting frequencies.

In some regions the Delgado Nachtigall brothers (GrupoPPP) and Isabel Quispe Desposrio (Corporación Universal) have applied for personal licenses. 

MERGERS

Media mergers

Description

Yes

No

N/A

MD

 

Can a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector?

This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector specific and/ or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector through merging operations. For instance, the law should prevent concentration in merging operations:

-By containing media-specific provisions that impose stricter thresholds than in other sectors;

 -The mandatory intervention of a media authority in merger and acquisition cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority);

 - The possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the communication authority for reasons of media pluralism (or public interest in general)); -that - even though they do not contain media-specific provisions - do not exclude the media sector from their scope of application.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

 

 

Existence (E) of safeguards

Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with rules on mergers and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?

This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system.

X

 

Only in the case of radio and open TV channels does the MTC evaluate whether a transfer (purchase-sale) of an authorization (license) can cause a holder to exceed the established limits (20% and 30%). However, through mechanisms such as the creation or use of companies with different business names, through natural persons and/or lease agreements or assignment of rights, some radio and TV groups would exceed the limits of use of frequencies or Authorizations for the transmission of their schedules.

 

 

 

Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:

·     Blocking of a merger or acquisition;

·     Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;

·     Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors

·     divestiture.

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

 

 

X

 

 

 

X

 

X

 

 

Total

 

 

 

 

 

 

To the question: Are these powers that impose sanctions or enforce the law used effectively?

Risk: High

Why?

Risk is considered high when the authority never uses its power to impose sanctions. In Peru, no cross-ownership hoarding has ever been sanctioned.

Cross-media Ownership Concentration

It is difficult to calculate the impacts of cross-ownership concentration. Measurement of audience share is different and difficult to compare (some are by surveys, others by average sales, by sample and by devices). Nor is there an open database on the market share of private and public advertising that the media have which would allow the calculation of their economic impact.

This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership in the different sectors: television, newspapers, radio and any other relevant type of media in the media industry (cross-media). The concentration is measured using the Top8 concentration measure.

Risk: High

Why?

In the absence of data to accurately calculate the concentration of cross-ownership of the media, it is considered high risk.

But qualitative research shows that the only group that enjoys a large participation in various sectors (television, press, internet) is El Comercio. Other groups that have diversified such as GrupoRPP, Corporación Universal, El Estado Peruano and Grupo La República, enjoy low participation in the other sectors.

This indicator measures the possible risk that there is in the market, not the current situation.

Regulatory Safeguards: Cross-media Ownership Concentration

There are no laws regulating the concentration of cross-ownership in the media. During the debate on the acquisition of Epensa by Grupo El Comercio, this was one of the topics for discussion. Yet since that date, the situation remains the same.

This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective application of regulatory safeguards (sector specific and/or competition law) against a high concentration of cross-ownership among different types of media (press, TV, radio, internet). Given the diversity of thresholds or limits that exist between different countries with respect to ownership and/or control, the 'high' measure should be assessed according to the standards of the country and in light of the thresholds or limits imposed by national laws.

 

Cross-MEDIA ownership

Description

Yes

No

N/A

MD

Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds, based on objective criteria, such as number of licences, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a high degree of cross-ownership between the different media?

This indicator aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors.

 

 

 

 

X

 

 

Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these thresholds and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media authority)

This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.

 

 

 

 

X

 

 

Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:

·     Refusal of additional licences;

·     Blocking of a merger or acquisition;

·     Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;

·     Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors

·     divestiture.

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

 

X

 

X

 

X

 

x

 

 

 

Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?

the relevant authority never uses its sanctioning powers

The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the regulation.

 

 

 

 

 

To the question: Are these powers that impose sanctions or enforce the law used effectively?

Risk: High

Why?

Risk is considered high when the respective authority never uses its power to impose sanctions. In this case, there is neither authority to deal with the issue nor are there sanctions.

 

Cross-Ownership

Description

Yes

No

N/A

MD

Can a high degree of cross-ownership between different media be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector?

For instance, cross-ownership can be prevented by competition law:

- by the mandatory intervention of a media authority in M&A cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority);

 - by the possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the competition authority for reasons of media pluralism (or Public interest in general);

 Even though the law does not contain media-specific provisions - it does not exclude the media sector from its scope of application

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

 

 

 

X

 

 

 

X

 

 

 

 

To the question: Is there evidence (for example in case law or positive evaluations in independent reports) of these powers being exercised effectively and properly? Are there proactive and effective policies for its creation and implementation?

Risk: High

Why?

Risk is considered high when the respective authority never uses its power to impose sanctions. In this case, the Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones (Ministry of Transport and Communications) has no capacity to issue sanctions for cross-concentration.

Ownership Transparency

There is no specific law that requires media companies to publish the names of their shareholders. Yet there is a law that requires companies to register their constitution and their initial shareholders in the Superintendencia Nacional de Registros Públicos (National Superintendence of Public Records) (Sunarp).

In order to carry out this search it is not enough to have the name of the type of media, but its official business name. There all documents of formation, increase in capital, changes of agents and other legal acts that a company has registered can be reviewed; previous payment is necessary for each document that is reviewed. Investigating each company has a high cost that few media companies are willing to pay.

The companies listed on the stock exchange, such as Grupo El Comercio, publish their corporate information on the Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores (Superintendence of the Securities Market) website.

The political affiliation of the owners of the media companies can be reviewed in the Registro de Organizaciones Políticas (Registry of Political Organizations) and the contributions to the electoral campaigns that are published by the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (National Office of Electoral Processes), which are open to the public.

This indicator aims to assess the transparency of data about media company owners’ political affiliations. The transparency of the company is considered a fundamental requirement to enforce media pluralism.

To the question: How could the transparency and accessibility of data in relation to media ownership be assessed?

Risk: Medium

Why?

Risk is considered medium when data is presented from media company owners and their political affiliations based on inquiries from journalists and media activists or upon request. In this case, the information is open to the public but it carries a cost and it does not always lead to the true owners.

Regulatory Safeguards: Ownership Transparency

All formal companies are required, at least, to register their formation and initial shareholders in the National Superintendence of Public Registries (Sunarp). This information is open to the public, for a fee.

One problem is that when there are changes in the shareholders, it is not necessary to register such changes with Sunarp. Only the current shareholder relationship is known when the company registers a new legal act (change of directors, managers, increase in capital, etc.), since it must be accompanied by a copy of the minutes in the last shareholders meeting.

However, there is a second problem: the names listed as shareholders may be legal representatives, mutual funds, offshores or ghost companies, which makes transparency difficult.

The third drawback is that it is not possible to search and verify whether a media company owner is a shareholder in other businesses. The Sunarp system only allows information to be obtained if that person is registered in a managerial position in other companies.

This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective application of transparency and disclosure provisions as regards ownership and/or control of the media companies.

Transparency Provisions

Yes

+

No

-

N/A

MD

 

Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to publish their ownership structures on their website or in records/documents that are accessible to the public?

X

 

 

 

Existence (E)

Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to report (changes in) ownership structures to public authorities (such as the media authority)?

X

 

 

Is there an obligation by national law to disclose relevant information after every change in ownership structure?

X

 

 

Are there any sanctions in case of non-respect of disclosure obligations?

 

X

 

 

Application efectiva (I)

Total (Mean of L-e und L-I sub-indicators)

 

 

To the question: Do these obligations ensure that the public is made aware of the natural person or legal entity that effectively owns or controls the media company?

Risk: Medium

Why?

Risk is considered medium when some owners are still unknown.

When requesting a frequency or participating in a tender for radio or television, legal entities must submit a copy of the company's constitution and bylaws, and the purpose of the company or association must be clear: the provision of broadcasting services. The documents include information about legal representatives, boards of directors, partners and/or shareholders.

When authorizations are transferred (licenses to issue), because the company or association which is the proprietor is transferred, authorization must be sought from the Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones (Ministry of Transport and Communications) and the same documentation must be submitted to the purchasers (legal entities).

When there is a transfer of shares or the legal representative is changed, transactions must also be reported to the MTC.

However, this information is not made public.

This does not apply in the case of printed or digital media. They only present their information to the Superintendencia de Registros Públicos (Superintendence of Public Records) when they want to change managers, increase capital or when they carry out any other legal act. Furthermore, not all types of media declare the name of the company behind the publication, which makes transparency difficult.

(Political) Control Over Media Outlets and Distribution Networks

In Peru political party institutions are quite low. Groups are created and disbanded every five years for the sole purpose of participating in an election. Many candidates participate without being affiliated, or are affiliated for a short time, to a political party.

Although in many cases the political affiliation of media entrepreneurs is known, none of those being investigated is affiliated with any party. This can be verified when reviewing the Registro de Organizaciones Políticas (Registry of Political Organizations) (ROP), which is open to the public on the Internet.

It has been observed that Higinio Capuñay, owner of Corporación Universal, has had a direct interest in the political party of the mayor of Lima, Luis Castañeda, whose daughter was a congresswoman for Solidaridad Nacional (National Solidarity) (SN); the manager of the company, Omar Castro, was a candidate for Congress for SN and supported the recall process of former mayor Susana Villarán, Castañeda’s political rival.

Other media companies have supported political campaigns, but the owners have not been affiliated. Panamericana Televisión, owned by Ernesto Schutz Freundt, was the showcase of manipulation where an audiotape was tampered with and then broadcast, which benefitted the candidate Keiko Fujimori. In 2011, El Comercio and América Televisión, owned by the Miro Quesada family, supported Keiko Fujimori, and Grupo La República supported Ollanta Humala.

As regards religious affiliations, the case that stands out is that of RPP. The archbishop of the Catholic Church in Lima, Juan Luis Cipriani, has a weekly program in which he gives his political, religious and social views.

One of the most important political variables in media companies is their relationship with the Fujimori regime, the major parliamentary force in the country: rejection, acceptance or neutrality.

As for distribution networks, there are no political affiliations on television or radio. Yet in written press, there is one case. Carlos Aguilar Susaya, leader of the Federación Nacional de Vendedores de Diarios y Revistas (National Federation of Newspaper and Magazine Vendors) has been a candidate for Congress for both APRA (2006) and Fuerza Popular (Popular Force) (2011).

This indicator assesses the risk of political affiliations and control of the media and distribution networks. The level of discrimination by distribution networks that have a political affiliation is also assessed.

To the question: What is the audience share in television whose owners are institutions with political affiliations?

Risk: Low

Why?

Risk is considered low when media companies with less than 30% audience share are owned by a particular political party, candidate, political group or someone with a political affiliation. In Peru, the owners who are being investigated are not registered with any party, even if they have clear sympathies.

To the question: What is the audience share in radio whose owners are institutions with political affiliations?

Risk: Low

Why?

Risk is considered low when media companies with less than 30% audience share are owned by a particular political party, candidate, political group or someone with a political affiliation. In Peru, the owners who are being investigated are not registered with any party, even if they have clear sympathies. 

To the question: What is the readership share in newspapers whose owners are institutions with political affiliations?

Risk: Low

Why?

Risk is considered low when media companies with less than 30% audience share are owned by a particular political party, candidate, political group or someone with a political affiliation. In Peru, the owners who are being investigated are not registered with any party, even if they have clear sympathies.

To the question: How could the behavior of the main distribution networks for printed media be assessed?

Risk: Medium

Why?

Risk is considered medium when at least one of the main distribution networks has a political affiliation or carries out politically oriented discriminatory actions. One of the leaders of the Federación Nacional de Vendedores de Diarios (National Federation of Newspaper Vendors) has been a candidate for Congress for two different political parties.

To the question: How could the behavior of the major radio networks be assessed?

Risk: Low

Why?

Risk is considered low when the main distribution networks do not have political affiliations or do not carry out politically oriented discriminatory actions.

To the question: How could the behavior of the major television networks be assessed?

Risk: Low

Why?

Risk is considered low when the main distribution networks do not have political affiliations or do not carry out politically oriented discriminatory actions.

(Political) Control Over Media Funding

State advertising has long been the subject of controversy. Spending is not centralized, but each public entity can contract media companies directly. Therefore, it is always in the public interest to know the contracts of each public entity, and the media companies that are favorable, and those that are adverse, to each public entity. Small yet influential media companies are also contracted, where the money can be the difference between the survival and the dissolution of the company.

The law that regulates state advertising (28874) requires public institutions to justify expenditure by presenting a media plan, a description of the campaign to be promoted, and a technical justification for the selection of media companies according to the target audience desired to be reached. However, there are no defined parameters to present the justification, for example, audience share. Regulations are stricter in the case of election campaigns. There have been cases where media companies that supported a successful candidate are awarded contracts for larger amounts than others with larger audiences.

In addition, most media contracts are exempt from going through a selection process, as opposed to state contracts, which does.

The contracts are public, as they appear on the Organismo Supervisor de Contrataciones del Estado (Supervisory Agency of State Contracts) website. However, the change in this system makes it impossible to see the annual turnover of each company that has contracts with the state. The amounts of each contract must be calculated manually. This limits transparency.

This indicator assesses the influence of the state as regards the operation of the media market, focusing in particular on the risk of discrimination in the distribution of state advertising. Discrimination can be reflected in favoritism towards political parties or affiliation to political parties in office or in the criminalization in the media that criticizes the government. 

To the question: Is state advertising distributed to media companies in a way that is proportional to their respective audience shares?

Risk: No data

Why?

In this case, there is not enough data for two reasons:

1) The new publication system of the Organismo de Contrataciones del Estado (Agency of State Contracts) cannot see the annual turnover of each media company. This would allow us to know whether the total distribution of state advertising is done according to audience shares.

2) There are no specific rules that set parameters for the distribution of state advertising.

3) Local media do not have an adequate measurement of their audience share. Distribution may be discretionary.

Although in Lima it is observed that state advertising has acceptable levels of proportionality, in other regions of the country this is much more debatable.

To the question: How could the distribution rules of state advertising be assessed?

Risk: High

Why?

Risk is considered high when there are no rules regarding the distribution of state advertising to the mass media. And in Peru there are no strict rules on this subject.

To the question: What is the share of state advertising in relation to the total television advertising market?

Risk: No data

Why?

The total amount of private investment is unknown. Also, the new system for reviewing state contracts from OSCE does not allow us to see the annual payment of contracts per company. A manual calculation must be made.

To the question: What is the share of state advertising in relation to the total radio advertising market?

Risk: No data

The total amount of private investment is unknown. Also, the new system for reviewing state contracts from OSCE does not allow us to see the annual payment of contracts per company. A manual calculation must be made.

To the question: What is the share of state advertising in relation to the total newspaper advertising market?

Risk: No data

The total amount of private investment is unknown. Also, the new system for reviewing state contracts from OSCE does not allow us to see the annual payment of contracts per company. A manual calculation must be made.

(Political) Control Over News Agencies

In Peru there is only one news agency with national coverage: Agencia Andina, established in 1981. It is entirely state-owned, through the Empresa Peruana de Servicios Editoriales S.A. (Peruvian Company of Editorial Services), which in turn belongs to Corporación Fonafe (Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento de la Actividad Empresarial del Estado (National Fund of Financing State Business Activities)).

Its current journalistic reports have been fused with the official newspaper El Peruano, also state-owned. The appointment of the company’s chairman of the board of directors comes from a proposal from the Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros (Presidency of the Council of Ministers).

This indicator attempts to assess the rank and independence of competing news agencies, including assessing the level of state ownership and the level of independence of state-owned news agencies.

To the question: What is the main news agency’s market share?

Risk: High

Why?

Risk is considered high when an agency controls more than 50% of the market. In this case, Agencia Andina is the only Peruvian agency in the market.

To the question: How could the political affiliation or dependence of the largest news agency be assessed?

Risk: High

Why?

Risk is considered high when most agencies belong to a group that has a political affiliation. In this case, Andean Agency is state-owned.

  • Project by
    Ojo Publico
  •  
    Reporters without borders
  • Funded by
    BMZ